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Final revision received 18 March 2017Across five studies using samples from both Japan and United States (N = 2345), we take a multi-method ap-
proach to test the prediction from life history theory that a slow, compared to fast, life history strategy promotes
investment in cooperative relationships. Studies 1 and 2 examined how different measures as proxies for life his-
tory strategy (i.e., Mini-K and High-K Strategy Scale) relate to cooperation in various economic games. Studies 3
to 5 measured early childhood environments (i.e., childhood harshness and unpredictability), manipulated re-
source scarcity using previously validated methods, and then measured cooperation. Across our studies, we
also examined four hypothesized psychological mechanisms that could explain the relation between life history
strategy and cooperation: temporal discounting, concern for reputation, social value orientation, and trust in
others. Overall, we found no support for the hypothesis that life history strategy predicts cooperation or that
early childhood environments interact with current resource scarcity to predict cooperation. Thus, our initial
findings imply that life history theory may not account for individual variation in cooperation with unknown
others.






All organisms have to make strategic decisions on how to allocate
finite resources across competing, fitness-relevant activities. Such re-
source allocation trade-offs form the foundation of life history theory,
which provides a theoretical framework to understand how, when,
and why individuals make fitness trade-offs to maximize their fitness
(Del Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015; Hill, 1993; Roff, 1992;
Stearns, 1992). Optimal trade-off strategies shape the expression of
various behaviors, including those relevant to mating, risk taking, and
aggression (Del Giudice, 2014; Figueredo et al., 2006; Hill, Ross, &
Low, 1997).
Social interactions similarly involve resource allocation trade-offs, in
particular between investing in oneself versus a relationship or group.
Indeed, it often occurs that one's short-term personal interest is in con-
flict with the long-term collective interest. In such social dilemma situ-
ations, each individual is tempted to behave selfishly to maximize their
own immediate outcome, whereas the collective can only thrive if ev-
eryone engages in cooperation—behavior that involves a personal cost
but can benefit others or the collective (Dawes, 1980; Rand & Nowak,
2013; Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). Thus, decisionsal Psychology, Beijing Normal
eijing 100875, P.R. China.to cooperate or not have important consequences for individuals, rela-
tionships, and groups. Previous theorizing suggests that human life his-
tory (LH) strategies may also be expressed in social behaviors, such as
long-term cooperation and reciprocity (Del Giudice, 2014; Del Giudice
et al., 2015), but no research has directly tested this prediction.
The present research uses both correlational and experimental ap-
proaches to test how LH strategy affects behavior in situationswith con-
flict of interest between self and others. We aimed to test (a) whether
faster or slower LH strategy relates to more cooperation in social inter-
actions, and (b) the proximate psychological mechanisms underlying
this relation (i.e., temporal discounting, concern for reputation, social
value orientation, and trust in others).1.1. The origin, development, and measures of life history (LH) strategy
Resource allocation trade-offs force individuals to prioritize one ac-
tivity over the other. One key trade-off concerns dividing resources to
somatic effort (e.g., growth,maintenance, and learning) versus reproduc-
tive effort (e.g., finding and attracting mates). For example, resources
invested in immune function can be diverted from resources used to at-
tract a mate. The allocation decisions to solve these fitness trade-offs
shape one's LH strategy, which varies on a fast-to-slow continuum
(Del Giudice et al., 2015; Nettle, 2010). Faster strategists tend to priori-
tize earlier fitness returns. They mature and reproduce earlier, have
497J. Wu et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior 38 (2017) 496–505more children, and invest less in any individual child. Conversely,
slower strategists prioritize later fitness returns. They reach sexual
maturation later, invest more in embodied capital, reproduce at an
older age, and have fewer children in whom they invest heavily (Del
Giudice et al., 2015; Ellis, Figueredo, Brumbach, & Schlomer, 2009).
The optimal LH strategies to maximize fitness depend on relevant
ecological conditions that vary in harshness (i.e., morbidity-mortality
rates caused by uncontrollable factors) and unpredictability (i.e., tem-
poral variation in harshness; Ellis et al., 2009; Frankenhuis,
Panchanathan, & Nettle, 2016). Natural selection may favor develop-
mental systems that use early-life experiences to calibrate later strate-
gies, such that harsh or unpredictable early-life environments (e.g.,
resource-scarce or dangerous environments) sensitize individuals to
follow faster strategies (Belsky, Schlomer, & Ellis, 2012; Ellis et al.,
2009). Indeed, individuals exposed to more unpredictable and rapidly
changing environments at age 0–5 tend to have more sexual partners
and be more risk taking at age 23 (Simpson, Griskevicius, Kuo, Sung, &
Collins, 2012). Importantly, the effects of early-life environments on in-
dividuals are magnified when presented with immediate stress in the
current environment. For example, harsher childhood environments
make peoplemore impulsive and risk-taking (i.e., traits related to faster
strategy) when they detect cues of mortality risk or resource scarcity
(Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & Robertson, 2011; Griskevicius et al.,
2013).
Individual differences in LH strategies are often measured through
either pre-existing measures of essential characteristics of LH strategies
(e.g., expected life span; Hill et al., 1997), or more direct self-report
scales (e.g., Manson, 2015). One scale is the 199-item Arizona Life His-
tory Battery (ALHB; Figueredo, 2007), with its short version—the 20-
item Mini-K (Figueredo et al., 2006). The ALHB included a set of cogni-
tive and behavioral indicators that converge on a single K-Factor,
which predicts various behaviors relevant to LH strategies. For example,
peoplewith high-K strategy tend to have fewer offspring, investmore in
those offspring, bemore committed to long-term relationships, and care
more about long-term benefits relative to short-term gains (Figueredo
et al., 2005, 2006). Another scale is the High-K Strategy Scale (HKSS;
Giosan, 2006) that measures fitness outcomes of LH strategies on a sin-
gle continuum, and higher K reflects a greater tendency toward slower
strategies. Evidence suggests that the Mini-K and High K Strategy Scale
tap a common construct and have relatively high internal consistency
(Dunkel & Decker, 2010).
1.2. Life history (LH) strategy and cooperation
As noted earlier, situations that involve a conflict of interests be-
tween self and others require individuals to decide whether to cooper-
ate or not. In such situations, selfish and exploitative behaviors benefit
oneself in the short term through immediate gains of resources, but
they often involve potential long-term costs, such as reputational dam-
age and ostracism. Conversely, cooperation requires forgoing immedi-
ate gains, but facilitates one to acquire long-term direct and indirect
benefits (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Fast and slow strategists might re-
solve this trade-off differently (Del Giudice, 2014; Figueredo et al., 2005;
Hill, Boehm, & Prokosch, 2016). Given that faster strategists discount de-
layed rewardsmore, and aremore risk taking (Griskevicius et al., 2011),
and impulsive (Mittal & Griskevicius, 2014), they might resolve the
aforementioned trade-off by pursuing their immediate self-interest.
Some recent evidence is consistent with this proposition: Harsh and
unstable childhood environment (e.g., family neglect, conflict and
violence) makes individuals more likely to exploit cooperative partners
and retaliate against others' defections (McCullough, Pedersen,
Schroder, Tabak, & Carver, 2013). Moreover, people from deprived (vs.
affluent) neighborhoods who tend to follow faster strategies allocate
less to others in dictator games, and are more likely to spoil public
goods (e.g., through littering; Nettle, Colléony, & Cockerill, 2011).
Despite initial support for the relation between LH strategy andcooperation, existing evidence is limited in twoways: First, it did not di-
rectly test how LH parameters (e.g., the K-Factor) relate to cooperation
orwhether early-life environments interact with current stress (e.g., re-
source scarcity) to predict cooperation. This research applies multiple
methods to test whether slower, compared to faster, strategists are
more cooperative (Hypothesis 1; H1). Second, the proximate psycho-
logicalmechanisms underlying this relation have received less attention
and are still unclear.1.3. The proximate mechanisms underlying life history (LH) strategy and
cooperation
Some evidence suggests that the tendency to value future rewards
over short-term benefits (e.g., temporal discounting, time preference,
delay of gratification)—a signature of slow LH strategy (Griskevicius et
al., 2011)—can predict cooperation. For example, people who care
about the future consequences of their behavior engage inmore pro-en-
vironmental behavior (Joireman, Lasane, Bennett, Richards, &
Solaimani, 2001), and less intergroup competition (Wolf et al., 2009).
Moreover, people who have lower temporal discounting rates tend to
be more cooperative (Curry, Price, & Price, 2008; Harris & Madden,
2002). Other research demonstrates that present and future orienta-
tions mediate the relation between developmental environments and
behavioral strategies of aggression or resource exploitation (Kruger,
Reischl, & Zimmerman, 2008). Thus, in addition to the hypothesis that
slower, compared to faster, strategists value future reward more and
have lower discount rates (Hypothesis 2a; H2a), temporal discounting
may mediate the relation between LH strategy and cooperation (Hy-
pothesis 2b; H2b).
People with different LH strategies—those who tend to vary in their
tendencies to value immediate versus future reward—may display dif-
ferent reputation management strategies. One's good reputation at-
tracts future opportunities to be chosen as coalition partners and to
receive delayed indirect benefits from third parties within groups and
social networks (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Sylwester & Roberts,
2010). People who value the future may care more about their reputa-
tion and future indirect benefits or costs, and so be more cooperative
(Barclay, 2012; Del Giudice et al., 2015). Thus, slower, compared to
faster, strategists may be more concerned about their reputation (Hy-
pothesis 3a; H3a). Given that concern for reputation facilitates coopera-
tive behavior in both economic games and real-life situations (for recent
reviews, see Milinski, 2016; Wu, Balliet, & Van Lange, 2016), reputa-
tional concernmaymediate the relation between LH strategy and coop-
eration (Hypothesis 3b; H3b).
Individuals also vary in dispositional preferences in outcome distri-
bution between self and others—a trait known as social value orienta-
tion (SVO; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Other-
regarding and prosocial (vs. self-regarding and proself) preferences
are more costly for faster strategists due to harsh and unpredictable
early-life environments. Hence, faster strategists might display more
proself orientation (Hypothesis 4a; H4a). Further, given that SVO pre-
dicts cooperation in both economic games and real-life situations,
such that prosocials are generally more cooperative than proselfs
(Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Van Lange, Agnew, Harinck, &
Steemers, 1997), SVO may mediate the relation between LH strategy
and cooperation (Hypothesis 4b; H4b).
Faster strategists from harsh and unpredictable childhood environ-
ments may also be more vulnerable to others' noncooperation and ex-
ploitation, especially in resource-scarce situations. Therefore, these
individuals may develop less trust in others to avoid being taken advan-
tage of by others. Thus, faster, compared to slower, strategists may trust
others less (Hypothesis 5a; H5a). Importantly, trust predicts one's coop-
eration in situations with conflict of interests between self and others
(Balliet & Van Lange, 2013), and so trust in others may mediate the re-
lation between LH strategy and cooperation (Hypothesis 5b; H5b).
Table 1
Cooperation measures in different economic games across waves (Study 1).
Game paradigm Cooperation measure and game description
Repeated one-shot prisoner's dilemma
game (Wave 2)
PDG1: proportion of trials in which participants gave the endowment to their partner
Participants played (a) a simultaneous game, a sequential game as (b) a first player and (c) the second player, each with three stake
sizes (JPY 300, 800, or 1500). They decided whether to give their endowment to their partner or keep it across nine trials. The
endowment was doubled if given to the other, but remained the same if kept for oneself.
One-shot prisoner's dilemma game
(Wave 4)
PDG2: proportion of endowment participants gave to their partnera
Participants were endowed with JPY 1000 and decided simultaneously how much to give to their partner. Any amount given to the
partner was doubled.
One-shot dictator game (Wave 3) DG1: proportion of endowment participants gave to the recipienta
Each participant was endowed with JPY 1000 and decided to give any of these to the recipient.
One-shot repeated dictator game
(Wave 3)
DG2: average proportion of endowment participants gave to the recipient
Participants played this game with six recipients. The size of the endowment varied from JPY 300 to JPY 1300 (i.e., 300, 400, 600, 700,
1200, and 1300). They made their decisions in increments of 10% as the allocator in each game.
Faith game (Wave 3) FG: proportion of endowment participants invested in their partner (i.e., the allocator in a previous DG)a
Participants (i.e., trustor) were matched with another participant who previously played a dictator game (DG) as an allocator. They
learned that their partner had decided howmuch of JPY 1000 to give to someone. Next, participants were given JPY 1000 and decided
how much to invest in their partner. The invested money was tripled and returned to participants according to the proportion that
their partner had allocated to the recipient in the previous DG.
1st and 2nd social dilemma game
(Waves 4 and 8)
SDG1 and SDG2: proportion of endowment participants contributed to the groupa
Each participant was endowed with JPY 1000 and contributed any amount to a public good. Total contribution to the public good was
doubled and equally divided among all group members.
Trust game (Wave 5) TGtrust: proportion of endowment participants sent to their partner as a trustora
TGreturn: average proportion of the tripled money they sent back as a trustee for all possible decisions of the trustor
Participants first acted as the trustor and sent some of JPY 1000 to the trustee. The trustee received the tripled amount and sent any
amount back to the trustor. The amount sent back remained the same value. Then participants indicated the amount they would send
back to the trustor in increments of 10% of the tripled money for 10 possible decisions of the trustor (i.e., the trustor sent JPY 100 to
JPY 1000 in increments of JPY 100).
Ultimatum game (Wave 5) UG: proportion of endowment participants offered to the responder as a proposera
Participants (i.e., proposer) initially received JPY 1500 and gave any amount to the responder, who decided whether to accept or
reject this offer. If the responder accepted, the endowment was divided according to the proposed offer; If the responder rejected,
both received nothing.
Third-party punishment game (Wave 6) TPPG: average proportion of endowment participants gave to the recipient as an allocator across the two TPPGsa
This game involved an allocator, a recipient, and an observer. The allocator initially received JPY 1500 and gave any amount to the
recipient. The recipient passively accepted the amount they were given. Then the observer decided how much of JPY 375 (in
increments of JPY 25) to spend to reduce the allocator's earnings. Any amount spent reduced four times of this amount from the
allocator. This game was played twice during which the observer either had no punishment fund or a punishment fund of JPY 500.
Impunity game (Wave 6) IG: the proportion of endowment participants offered to the responder as a proposera
Participants (i.e., proposer) were initially endowed with JPY 1500 and decided how much to offer to the responder, who had to
accept or reject this offer. If the responder accepted, the endowment was divided according to the proposed offer; If the responder
rejected, the responder earned nothing, but the proposer still earned the amount kept for self.
Stag hunt game (Wave 8) SHG: participants' decision to invest (or not invest) in their partner
Two participants decided simultaneously whether to invest in their partner or not. If both invested, both earned JPY 1000; If only one
invested, the one who invested earned nothing, whereas the other earned JPY 500; If neither invested, both earned JPY 500.
a Participants made their decisions in increments of JPY 100. For more detailed game descriptions, see Supplementary materials.
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Weconductedfive correlational and experimental studies to test our
hypotheses (see Table 3). Studies 1 and 2 used the Mini-K and High-K
Strategy Scales as proxy measures for LH strategy (see also Patch &
Figueredo, 2016), and observed cooperation in various economic
games. Studies 3 through 5 measured early childhood SES and unpre-
dictability (Griskevicius et al., 2011), andmanipulated resource scarcity
with previously validated methods—a picture slideshow indicating re-
source scarcity (vs. resource abundance or control; see Vaughn,
Cronan, & Beavers, 2014) or different initial endowments in an eco-
nomic game (see Krosch & Amodio, 2014). Study 5 also manipulated
outcome interdependence with different payoff structures in two eco-
nomic games. Across several studies, we measured the hypothesized
psychological factors that may explain the relation between LH strategy
and cooperation (i.e., temporal discounting, concern for reputation,
SVO, and trust in others).2. Study 1
Study 1 used a correlational approach to testwhether LH strategy re-
lates to cooperation using a non-student Japanese sample. We mea-
sured LH strategy with the Mini-K and High-K Strategy Scales, and
cooperation with twelve economic games.2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants and design
Six hundred non-student residents in a suburban city of Tokyo were
selected from about 1670 applicantswho responded to a flyer distributed
to about 180,000 households. They were invited to participate in a large
research project with eight waves. Five hundred sixty-three residents
(290 women,Mage = 39.96 years, SD = 10.79) voluntarily participated
in the initial wave that included demographic measures of age and sex.
Themeasures reported in this studywere only a few of all the psycholog-
ical and behavioral measures included in this large multi-wave project
(Ns = 483, 489, 473, 471, 470, 451, 424 fromWave 2 to 8).2.1.2. Procedure and materials
Participants completed the Mini-K in Waves 4 and 7 (αs = .81 and
.79), and the High-K Strategy Scale in Wave 6 (α = .88) as proxies for
LH strategy. The 20-item Mini-K (e.g., “I often make plans in advance”;
“while growing up, I had a warm relationship with my biological
mother”) was rated on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 =
strongly agree; Figueredo et al., 2006). The average score across items con-
stituted the K-Factor, and higher K indicated slower LH strategy (Patch &
Figueredo, 2016). Participants' two Mini-K scores were highly correlated, r
(435) = .76, p b .001, and were averaged into a composite score of
Mini-K (M = 4.18, SD = 0.62). The High-K Strategy Scale (HKSS)
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comfortable and secure home”; 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly
agree), except for item 19 (i.e., Are you married or cohabitating?) that
was coded as 1(no) or 5(yes) (Giosan, 2006). Removing items that
only apply to married or partnered participants, we used the average
score across the first 22 items to obtain HKSS score. The Mini-K and
HKSS measures were highly correlated, r(428) = .59, p b .001.
Across different waves, participants interacted with others in twelve
economic games with thirteen cooperation measures (i.e., proportion of
cooperative trials or endowment given to one's partner or group), and
their decisions had monetary consequences (e.g., Shinada & Yamagishi,
2014; Yamagishi et al., 2012, 2013; Yamagishi, Li, Takagishi, Matsumoto,
& Kiyonari, 2014; see Table 1). All cooperation measures were positively
correlated (r ranges from .14 to .71, ps b .01), and were averaged into a
composite score of cooperation (M= 0.40, SD= 0.18).
2.2. Results and discussion
Correlational analyses revealed that neither Mini-K, r(346)= .06,
p= .29, nor HKSS, r(352)= .06, p= .27, significantly correlated with
cooperation. This evidence implies that LH strategy does not relate to
cooperation in economic games.1
3. Study 2
Study 2 further tested the relation between LH strategy and cooper-
ation using a non-student sample from the United States.Wemeasured
(a) early-life environments and LH strategy (i.e., Mini-K), (b) temporal
discounting, concern for reputation, SVO, and trust in others as pro-
posed mediators, and (c) cooperation in a dictator game (DG) and a
prisoner's dilemma game (PDG).
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants and design
Participants were 508 US adults (306 women, Mage = 35.84 years,
SD = 12.15) recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). They
completed the study for US$1.00. Twenty-one participants won an
extra 2-dollar bonus based on their decisions during the study.2
3.1.2. Procedure and materials
After providing informed consent, participants first completed mea-
sures of childhood unpredictability, childhood SES, and Mini-K (same
items as Study 1, −3 = strongly disagree, +3 = strongly agree), then
the random-ordered measures of temporal discounting, concern for
reputation, SVO, and trust in others. Afterward, they completed two de-
cision making tasks3: (a) a dictator game (DG; Forsythe, Horowitz,1 Other relevantmeasures included (a) temporal discounting (Wave 4): 29-trial choices
between a smaller immediate reward and a larger delayed reward (Kirby, Petry, & Bickel,
1999); (b) SVO (Wave 5): six primary items of the SVO slider measure (Murphy,
Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011); (b) general trust (Waves 1, 3, and 6): five items on a
7-point scale (e.g., “Most people are trustworthy”; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly
agree; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Correlational analyses revealed that (a) temporal
discounting (i.e., delay-discounting rates) did not significantly correlate with Mini-K, r
(434) = −0.03, p = .52, or HKSS, r(449) = −0.04, p = .40, which did not support
H2a; (b) SVO did not significantly correlate with Mini-K, r(425)= 0.09, p= .06, or HKSS,
r(453) = 0.003, p = 0.95, and so H4a was not supported; (c) general trust significantly
correlated with Mini-K, r(419)= 0.32, p b .001, and HKSS, r(454)= 0.35, p b .001, which
supported H5a.
2 In Studies 2 to 5, participants earned points based on their decisions in the economic
games used tomeasure cooperation. Each point wasworth a 0.02% chance to win a 2-dol-
lar bonus. Thus, more earnings of points relate to a higher chance to win the bonus. We
randomly selected the bonus winners at the end of each study based on their earned
points.
3 Participants also completed a 16-itemprosocialitymeasure (e.g., sharing, helping, tak-
ing care of others, and empathic feelings toward others' needs; Caprara, Steca, Zelli, &
Capanna, 2005). Some items overlapped with the Mini-K, so we did not report results
for this measure.Savin, & Sefton, 1994), in which participants freely divided 100 points
between themselves and an ostensible recipient online (i.e., Person
X); (b) a prisoner's dilemma game (PDG; Van Lange & Kuhlman,
1994), in which participants and their ostensible interaction partner
(i.e., Person Y) were each initially endowed with 100 points, and each
decided simultaneously to give any point to the other, who would re-
ceive the doubled amount. The points kept for oneself remained the
same value. The number of points participants gave to their partner in
the two games were highly correlated, r(506) = 0.44, p b .001, and
were averaged into a composite score of cooperation (M = 45.02,
SD= 22.58). Finally, participants reported their age and sex, learned
about their partner's decision (i.e., 50 points, pre-programmed) in the
PDG and their total earnings (range: 100 to 300 points) based on their
decisions across two games, and were debriefed.
3.1.2.1. Childhood unpredictability. We used two measures of childhood
unpredictability from earlier work on childhood environments and LH
strategy: (a) three items (α = .65; e.g., “In your early childhood, did
your parents or legal guardians change jobs or occupational status?”)
on a 5-point scale (1 = never, 5 = many times; Szepsenwol, Simpson,
& Griskevicius, 2015), and (b) three items (α = .84; e.g., “When I was
younger than 10, things were often chaotic in my house.”) on a 7-
point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree, Mittal,
Griskevicius, Simpson, Sung, & Young, 2015). Given the high correlation
between the twomeasures, r(506)= .58, p b .001, we standardized the
two mean scores and averaged the obtained z-scores as the index of
childhood unpredictability (M = 0.00, SD = 0.89).
3.1.2.2. Childhood SES. Participants rated three items from previous re-
search (α = .83; e.g., “My family usually had enough money when I
was growing up”) on a 7-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly
agree; Griskevicius et al., 2011). Higher average scores indicate higher
childhood SES (M = 3.47, SD= 1.44).
3.1.2.3. Temporal discounting. Participants completed a randomized 20-
item measure of temporal discounting (α = .91; see Griskevicius et
al., 2013). For each item, they chose between an immediate smaller re-
ward the next day (from $9 to $86) and a delayed larger reward in
33 days (from $47 to $89). The number of delayed rewards chosen
was the index of temporal discounting (M = 11.81, SD= 4.49).
3.1.2.4. Concern for reputation. Participants rated seven items used in
previous research (α = .86; e.g., “If my reputation is not good, I feel
very bad”) on a 5-point scale (1 = absolutely disagree, 5 = absolutely
agree; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). Higher average scores indicate more
concern for reputation (M = 3.44, SD= 0.78).
3.1.2.5. Social value orientation (SVO). Across six primary items of SVO
Slider Measure (Murphy et al., 2011), participants chose their preferred
monetary allocation between themselves and an anonymous person.
Based on their choices, we calculated a continuous index of SVO (i.e.,
SVO°). Higher scores indicate more prosocial orientation (M = 27.92,
SD= 13.19).
3.1.2.6. Trust in others. Participants rated their agreement with three
items (α = .64; e.g., “I completely trust most other people”) on a 7-
point scale (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree; Van Lange,
Vinkhuyzen, & Posthuma, 2014).4 Higher average scores indicate more
trust in others (M = 3.17, SD= 1.25).4 Participants also rated three items (α = .57; e.g., “I believe that most other people
trust me”) that measure trust in self (i.e., one's beliefs regarding other people's trust in
self). Because this conceptwas not related to our research questions, we did not report re-
sults for this measure.
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We expected that slower strategists would be more cooperative
(H1). The significant correlations betweenMini-K and childhood unpre-
dictability, r(506)=−.17, p b .001, and childhood SES, r(506)= .24, p b
.001, offered convergent validity for the three measures as reflecting LH
strategy. However, higher K did not relate to more cooperation, r
(506) = .07, p = .14, which did not support H1.
We also predicted that slower strategists are more likely to value fu-
ture rewards than immediate benefits, more concerned about their rep-
utation,more prosocially oriented, andmore likely to trust others (H2a–
H5a). Correlational analyses revealed that high-K strategy related to
more concern for reputation, r(506)= .20, p b .001, more prosocial ori-
entation toward others, r(506)= .10, p= .02, andmore trust in others,
r(506)= .25, p b .001. However, opposite to H2a,Mini-K negatively cor-
related with temporal discounting, r(506) = −.10, p = .02, such that
high-K strategy relates to less preference in delayed rewards.
Cooperation did not correlate with temporal discounting, r(506) =
−.01, p = .75, but positively correlated with concern for reputation, r
(506) = .13, p = .004, SVO, r(506) = .42, p b .001, and trust in others,
r(506) = .13, p= .003. Researchers suggest that significant indirect ef-
fects (i.e., mediation) can occur in the absence of significant total or di-
rect effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable
(Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011). LH strategy might affect co-
operation indirectly through some of the proposed mediators. Thus, we
further tested the hypotheses that temporal discounting, concern for
reputation, SVO, and trust in others mediate the relation between LH
strategy and cooperation (H2b–H5b) using bootstrapping method for
multiple mediation based on 5000 bootstrap samples (Preacher &
Hayes, 2008). The indirect effect of Mini-K on cooperation was signifi-
cant through concern for reputation, b = 0.41, 95% CI [0.02, 1.00],
SVO, b = 1.09, 95% CI [0.08, 2.17], and trust in others, b = 0.61, 95% CI
[0.11, 1.27], but was not significant through temporal discounting,
b = 0.03, 95% CI [−0.19, 0.35]. These results provided some support
for H3b, H4b, and H5b, but did not support H2b.
4. Study 3
Study 3 further tested whether slower, compared to faster, strate-
gists would show greater cooperation (H1). Here, we operationalized
LH strategy as the magnifying effect of early-life environments contin-
gent on current environmental harshness (i.e., resource scarcity; see
Griskevicius et al., 2013), and tested their interaction in predicting coop-
eration. We also tested H2a and H2b on the mediation of temporal
discounting.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants and design
Participants were 456 US adults (277 women, Mage = 36.10 years,
SD=12.47) recruited fromMTurk. Theywere randomly assigned to re-
source scarcity, resource abundance, or control condition. They com-
pleted the study for US$0.80. Thirteen participants won an extra 2-
dollar bonus based on their decisions.
4.1.2. Procedure and materials
After providing informed consent, participants completed several
ostensibly unrelated tasks from different studies (i.e., visual recognition
and memory, outcome preference, and decision making). They first
viewed a 1-min slideshow of pictures about a “news story” that indi-
cated resource scarcity (e.g., empty wallet) or resource abundance (e.g.,
full wallet), or did not see a slideshow (control). This method has been
used in prior research to manipulate perceptions of resource scarcity
(Hill, Rodeheffer, Griskevicius, Durante, & White, 2012; Rodeheffer,
Hill, & Lord, 2012; Vaughn et al., 2014). Then, for “memory decay”, they
completed an outcome preference task that was the 20-item temporaldiscounting measure as in Study 1. The number of delayed rewards they
chose was the index of temporal discounting (α = .92). Afterward, they
were asked to recall as many pictures as possible and describe the “news
story”. Next, participants completed a decisionmaking task (i.e., a dictator
game) as an allocator, who freely divided 10 points between themselves
and a recipient (Forsythe et al., 1994). The number of points they gave to
their partner was the measure of cooperation (range: 0 to 10).
After their decision,we assessed their perceived childhood SES (α=
.87, three items, same as Study 1) and current SES (α= .91, three items;
e.g., “I have enough money to buy things I want”) using measures from
previous research on a 7-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly
agree; Griskevicius et al., 2011). Participants' childhood SES (M = 3.60,
SD= 1.60) and current SES (M= 3.57, SD= 1.70) were modestly cor-
related, r(454) = .33. Finally, participants reported their age and sex,
and were debriefed. One suspicion check question suggested that they
did not realize the real purpose of the study.4.2. Results and discussion
4.2.1. Cooperation
To test our hypotheses, we dummy coded resource scarcity into two
contrast variables (scarcity-versus-abundance contrast and scarcity-ver-
sus-control contrast) and performed a hierarchical regression analysis
on cooperation (see Table 2). Childhood SES was centered prior to anal-
ysis (Aiken & West, 1991). We found no significant effect of scarcity-
versus-abundance contrast (p = .15), scarcity-versus-control contrast
(p = .58), or childhood SES (p = .94). Childhood SES did not interact
with the two contrasts in predicting cooperation (ps N .67). An alterna-
tive hierarchical regression analysis that also included current SES (step
1) and their interactions with the two contrasts (step 2) revealed the
same results: no significant effects of the two contrasts, childhood SES,
or their interactions (ps N .14). Thus, we found no support for H1 (i.e.,
slower LH strategy relates to more cooperation).4.2.2. Temporal discounting
The same hierarchical regression analysis on temporal discounting
revealed no significant effects of the two contrasts or childhood SES
(ps N 0.16). Childhood SES did not interact with scarcity-versus-
abundance contract, β = .01, t(450) = 0.21, p = .84, or scarcity-
versus-control contrast, β= .01, t(450)= 0.21, p= .84, to predict tem-
poral discounting. An alternative hierarchical regression analysis that
also included current SES (step 1) and their interactions with the two
contrasts (step 2) revealed the same results: no significant effects of
the two contrasts, childhood SES, or their interactions (ps N 0.08). The
non-significant interactions lend no support for H2a (i.e., slower strate-
gists discount future rewards less) or H2b (i.e., temporal discounting
mediates the relation between LH strategy and cooperation).5. Study 4
Study 4 conceptually replicated Study 3 using a different manipula-
tion of resource scarcity, and further tested whether slower strategists
are more prosocially orientated (H4a), and whether SVO mediates the
relation between LH strategy and cooperation (H4b).5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants and design
Participants were 302 US adults (169 women, Mage = 35.90 years,
SD=11.54) recruited fromMTurk. Theywere randomly assigned to re-
source scarcity condition or control condition. They completed the
study for US$0.80. Nine participants won an extra 2-dollar bonus
based on their decisions.
Table 2
Hierarchical regression analyses predicting cooperation from resource scarcity, childhood SES, and outcome interdependence (Studies 3 to 5).
Variable Cooperation
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
β t β t β t
Study 3
D1 .08 1.45 .08 1.48
D2 .03 0.56 .03 0.61
Childhood SES − .003 −0.07 − .001 −0.01
D1 × childhood SES .02 0.34
D2 × childhood SES − .03 −0.42
Study 4
Resource scarcity .02 0.26 .02 0.26
Childhood SES − .18 −3.24⁎ − .17 −2.06⁎
Resource scarcity × childhood SES −0.01 −0.17
Study 5
Resource scarcity .05 1.19 .06 1.03 .06 1.05
Childhood SES .006 0.15 .02 0.23 .004 0.05
Outcome interdependence .36 9.55⁎ .37 6.94⁎ .37 6.93⁎
Resource scarcity × childhood SES .02 0.34 .04 0.47
Resource scarcity × outcome interdependence − .02 −0.26 − .02 −0.26
Childhood SES × outcome interdependence − .03 −0.59 − .01 −0.19
Childhood SES × resource scarcity × outcome interdependence − .03 −0.33
Note. D1 = scarcity-versus-abundance contrast, D2 = scarcity-versus-control contrast. Childhood SES as a continuous variable was centered prior to analyses.
⁎ p b .05.
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Participants first completed the measures of childhood unpredict-
ability (same as Study 2), childhood SES and current SES (same as
Study 3). Then theywere instructed to interact with another person on-
line in a decisionmaking task (i.e., a prisoner's dilemma game).We var-
ied the relative initial endowment in the prisoner's dilemma game to
manipulate resource scarcity. This method has been validated in previ-
ous research to successfullymanipulate economic resource scarcity (see
Krosch & Amodio, 2014, Study 3). Participants were ostensibly paired
with another person online (i.e., Person X). They learned that each of
themwould first receive some points and then decide howmany points
to give the other person. The points given to the other person would be
doubled, and the points kept for oneself would retain the same value.
Participants learned that they could initially receive up to 100 (resource
scarcity condition) or 10 (control condition) points, and then were
assigned 10 points in both conditions. Thus, they believed to have a rel-
atively small amount or themaximum amount out of possible funds (10
out of 100 or 10 out of 10).We used two items (i.e., “I feel that I have re-
ceived enough initial amount of points given themaximum I can get”; “I
feel that I have limited amount of points to give to Person X”) on a 7-
point scale (1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) for themanipula-
tion check. The number of points participants gave to the other person
was the measure of cooperation.
Prior to participants' decision, they completed the SVO measure
(same as Study 1) by choosing their preferred monetary allocation be-
tween themselves and Person X they were paired with in this task.
After their decision, they learned about their partner's decision (i.e., 5
points, pre-programmed) and their earnings. Finally, they reported
their age and sex, and were debriefed.
5.2. Results and discussion
5.2.1. Manipulation check
Overall, participants in the resource scarcity condition (M=5.76,
SD=1.40) perceived to have less resources than those in the control
condition (M = 2.58, SD = 1.35), F(1, 300) = 403.48, p b .001, ηp2 =
0.57. Thus, the manipulation of resource scarcity was successful.
5.2.2. Cooperation
We first tested whether childhood SES interacts with resource scar-
city in predicting cooperation using a hierarchical regression analysis(see Table 2). Opposite to our predication, lower childhood SES was
associated with more cooperation (step 1), β = − .18, t(299) =
−3.24, p = .001. There was no significant Resource Scarcity × Child-
hood SES interaction predicting cooperation, β = − .01, t(298) =
− .17, p = .87. These results were the same after controlling for child-
hood unpredictability and current SES.
An alternative regression that replaced childhood SES with child-
hood unpredictability also revealed no significant effect of resource
scarcity (p = .81), childhood unpredictability (p = .59), or Resource
Scarcity × Childhood Unpredictability interaction, β = .04, t(298) =
0.42, p= .67. These effects remained the same (ps N 0.19) after control-
ling for childhood SES and current SES. Thus, we found no support for
H1 that slower strategists are more cooperative.
5.2.3. Social value orientation (SVO)
Hierarchical regression analysis on SVO revealed no significant effect
of resource scarcity (p = .69), childhood SES (p = .91), or Resource
Scarcity × Childhood SES interaction, β = − .08, t(298) = −0.88, p =
.38. These effects remained the same (ps N 0.32) after controlling for
childhood unpredictability and current SES. An alternative regression
analysis that replaced childhood SES with childhood unpredictability
also revealed no significant effect of resource scarcity (p = .67), child-
hood unpredictability (p = .11), or Resource Scarcity × Childhood Un-
predictability interaction on SVO, β = −0.004, t(298) = −0.05, p =
.96. These effects were the same (ps N 0.11) after controlling for child-
hood SES and current SES. Thus, we found no support for H4a (i.e.,
slower strategists aremore prosocially oriented) or H4b (i.e., SVOmedi-
ates the relation between LH strategy and cooperation).
6. Study 5
Studies 1 to 4 found no support for the direct relation between LH
strategy and cooperation. One potential explanationmay be that the be-
havioral patterns related to LH strategy depend on specific social inter-
action contexts. Indeed, organisms may strategically adjust their
resource allocation decisions in response to local contextual cues
(Kuzawa & Bragg, 2012; McNamara & Houston, 1996). For example,
contradictory findings that climatic uncertainty (vs. stability) either un-
dermines or promotes cooperative breeding in birds (e.g., Gonzalez,
Sheldon, & Tobias, 2013; Jetz & Rubenstein, 2011; Rubenstein &
Lovette, 2007) suggest that life history variation in cooperation may
be explained by potential moderators.
5 We also conducted sensitivity power analyses to compute the critical population
effect size as a function of α (.5), 1-β (.80), and Ns (473, 508, 456, 302, 606) across our
studies. The minimal correlation we could detect in Studies 1 and 2 were 0.13 and 0.12,
and theminimal effect sizes (f2) we could detect in Studies 3 to 5were 0.03, 0.04, and 0.02.
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interaction partner (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003).While it is beneficial to
withhold resources and act selfishly in resource-scarce environment
when one can fully determine one's outcome, cooperation can be
more beneficialwhen one is interdependentwith others. Thus, outcome
interdependence may be a key factor that determines how LH strategy
relates to cooperation. For faster strategists, selfish behavior might be
favorable in the short termwhen one is outcome-independent, whereas
cooperation is more appealing in outcome-interdependent situations.
Thus, Study 5 tested the prediction that faster strategists aremore coop-
erative in an outcome-interdependent situation than in an outcome-in-
dependent situation, whereas slower strategists do not vary their
cooperation across the two situations (Hypothesis 6; H6).
6.1. Method
6.1.1. Participants and design
Participants were 608 US adults (310 women, Mage = 34.57 years,
SD = 11.42) recruited from MTurk. They were randomly assigned to
one of the four conditions in a 2 (resource scarcity: resource scarcity,
control) × 2 (outcome interdependence: independent, interdependent)
between-participants design. They completed the study for US$1.20.
Thirteen participants won an extra 2-dollar bonus based on their deci-
sions. Two participants were excluded from the analyses, because one
of them took the survey for the second time, and the other stated to
have answered the survey questions in a reversed order.
6.1.2. Procedure and materials
The manipulation of resource scarcity and the measures of child-
hood unpredictability, childhood SES, and current SES were the same
as Study 4, with the following exceptions:
Wemanipulated outcome interdependencewith amodified dictator
game (outcome-independent) and a modified trust game (outcome-in-
terdependent). In the dictator game, participants (i.e., allocator) were
initially endowed with 10 (out of 100 or 10) points and gave any
point to a recipient, who would receive the doubled amount. In the
trust game, participants (i.e., trustor) were initially endowed with 10
(out of 100 or 10) points and sent any amount of points to a trustee,
who would receive the doubled amount. Afterward, the trustee could
send some of the doubled amount back to the trustor, and the amount
sent back was also doubled. The number of points participants gave to
their partner in each game was the measure of cooperation.
For a manipulation check of outcome interdependence, participants
completed the 30-item Situational Interdependence Scale (Gerpott,
Balliet, & de Vries, 2015), which includes five subscales (interdepen-
dence, temporal dimension, conflict, information certainty, and
power; αs = .69, .80, .82, .77, and .95), each with six items on a 5-
point Likert scale (for the first four subscales, 1 = completely agree,
5 = completely disagree; for the power subscale, 1 = definitely the
other, 5= definitely myself). Sample items for the interdependence sub-
scale include “We need each other to get our best outcome in this situa-
tion”. We reverse-coded items so that higher average score on this
subscale indicated higher perceived interdependencewith one's partner.
6.2. Results and discussion
6.2.1. Manipulation checks
We conducted 2 (Resource Scarcity) × 2 (Outcome Interdepen-
dence) ANOVAs on perceived scarcity and perceived interdependence,
separately. Participants in the resource scarcity condition (M = 6.00,
SD = 1.20) perceived to have less than those in the control condition
(M = 2.42, SD = 1.31), F(1, 602) = 1239.69, p b .001, ηp2 = 0.67.
Participants in the outcome-interdependent condition (M = 4.10, SD
= 0.77) perceived higher interdependence with their partner than
those in the outcome-independent condition (M = 3.69, SD= 0.67), F(1, 602)= 48.26, p b .001, ηp2 = 0.07. Thus, the manipulations of re-
source scarcity and outcome interdependence were successful.
6.2.2. Cooperation
Hierarchical regression analysis on cooperation revealed that only
outcome interdependence significantly predicted cooperation, β =
.36, t(602) = 9.55, p b .001, with more cooperation in the outcome-in-
terdependent situation (i.e., modified trust game;M=6.16, SD=3.36)
than in the outcome-independent situation (i.e., modified dictator game;
M = 3.64, SD = 3.10). The main effects of resource scarcity (p = .24),
childhood SES (p= .88), and the expected Resource Scarcity × Outcome
Interdependence × Childhood SES interaction, β = − .03, t(598) =
−0.33, p= .74, were not significant (see Table 2). An alternative hierar-
chical regression analysis that replaced childhood SESwith childhood un-
predictability also revealed that only outcome interdependence
significantly predicted cooperation, β= .36, t(602) = 9.57, p b .001. All
the other main effects or interactions were not significant (ps N 0.21).
Thus, we found no support for H1 that slower strategists displaymore co-
operation, or H6 that outcome interdependence moderates this relation.
7. General discussion
Life history theory provides an overarching theoretical framework to
understand how organisms allocate limited resources to activities that
enhance survival or reproduction (Del Giudice et al., 2015; Hill, 1993).
Faster versus slower LH strategies manifest themselves in various do-
mains (e.g., mating, parenting, and social behaviors), and they function
to tailor fitness trade-offs to varied environmental conditions (West &
Gardner, 2013). Life history theory has been used to predict that slower,
compared to faster, strategists would invest more in cooperative rela-
tionships (e.g., Del Giudice, 2014; Nettle, 2010; Nettle et al., 2011), yet
no empirical research has directly tested this prediction. The present re-
search contributes to extant literature on life history variation in coop-
erative decision making. Using large samples from Japan and the
United States, we sought to test (a) whether slower LH strategy is asso-
ciated with greater cooperation, (b) the potential psychological mecha-
nisms underlying this effect (i.e., temporal discounting, concern for
reputation, SVO, and trust in others), and (c) whether situational out-
come interdependence moderates the relation between LH strategy
and cooperation. In Studies 1 and 2, we used two proxy measures for
LH strategy, and correlated themwith cooperation in various economic
games. In Studies 3 to 5, we measured participants' early-life environ-
ments, manipulated current resource scarcity, and operationalized LH
strategy as the magnifying effects of early-life experiences contingent
on current resource scarcity. Thus, a significant interaction between
early-life experiences and resource scarcity predicting cooperation
would support a link between LH strategy and cooperation (see also
Griskevicius et al., 2011, 2013). Table 3 provides the list of hypotheses
and empirical support in the present research.
Further random-effects meta-analyses across all studies revealed no
significant relation between (a) Mini-K and cooperation (N = 856,
Studies 1 and 2), r = .06, 95% CI [−0.005, 0.13], (b) childhood unpre-
dictability and cooperation (N = 1418, Studies 2, 4, and 5), r =
− .001, 95% CI [− .05, 0.05], or (c) childhood SES and cooperation,
(N= 1874, Studies 2 to 5), r = − .05, 95% CI [−0.13, 0.04]. Moreover,
across Studies 3 to 5, the correlation between childhood SES and coop-
eration did not differ between the resource scarcity condition (N
= 603), r = − .04, 95% CI [−0.19, 0.10], and the control condition (N
= 611), r=− .06, 95% CI [−0.16, 0.05].5 Overall, we found no support
for the hypothesis that a slower, compared to faster, LH strategy pro-
motes cooperation.
Table 3
Hypotheses tested across studies and support (or no support) for the hypotheses.
# Hypotheses Support
1 Slower, compared to faster, strategists are more cooperative. No
2a Slower, compared to faster, strategists value future rewards more
than immediate benefits.
No
2b Temporal discounting mediates the relation between LH strategy
and cooperation.
No
3a Slower, compared to faster, strategists are more concerned about
their reputation.
Yes
3b Concern for reputation mediates the relation between LH strategy
and cooperation.
Partly
4a Faster, compared to slower, strategists display more proself
orientation.
Noa
4b Social value orientation mediates the relation between LH strategy
and cooperation.
Noa
5a Faster, compared to slower, strategists are less likely to trust others. Yes
5b Trust in others mediates the relation between LH strategy and
cooperation.
Partly
6 Faster, compared to slower, strategists are more cooperative in an
outcome-interdependent situation than an outcome-independent
situation.
No
Note. Slower/faster strategists = people following slower/faster LH strategy.
a While Study 2 found some support for H4a and H4b, Studies 1 (see footnote 1) and 4
did not support H4a or H4b. Taken together, there was no overall support for H4a or H4b.
503J. Wu et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior 38 (2017) 496–505We suggest four broad interpretations for the present findings. First,
the use of psychometric indicators (e.g., theMini-K and High-K Strategy
Scale) as proxies for LH strategy may not be adequate. For example,
Copping, Campbell, andMuncer (2014b) found that theHigh-K Strategy
Scale did not have adequate statistical fit to the data of objective mea-
sures of relevant life history variables (e.g., the age of sexual debut).
Thus, bettermeasures of life history strategy need to bedeveloped to ac-
curately test the relation between LH strategy and cooperation.
Second, participants were only involved in one-shot interactions
with unknown others. Such situations did not contain opportunities
for subsequent reciprocity or cues that a (un)cooperative reputation
could result in future indirect benefits or costs. It is possible that these
“experimentally clean” situations do not afford motives affected by life
history. For example, life history variations may predict behavior in situ-
ations with stronger reputational concerns, and in extended social inter-
actions. Arguing from this perspective, it was interesting to see that
findings in Studies 1 and (or) 2 provided some support for the hypotheses
that slower, compared to faster, strategists are in generalmore concerned
about their reputation (H3a), (somewhat but inconsistently) more
prosocially orientated (H4a), and more likely to trust others (H5a).
Third, fast and slow strategists might respond differently toward ge-
netically related others, friends, community members, and strangers.
Some evidence suggests that high-K strategists invest more in geneti-
cally related individuals (Figueredo et al., 2005). Clearly, it is plausible
that one's cooperation toward kin may be extended to others in one's
immediate social environment, with whom one shares histories and fu-
ture interactions. Yet it might be challenging to generalize cooperative
tendencies rooted in genetic fitness to cooperation toward complete
strangers. Future research could distinguish between kin, friends, com-
munity members, and strangers, and focus on contexts where reputa-
tional concerns and interaction-based trust are more salient.
Fourth, cooperation in economic games is often costly and involves
direct monetary consequences. This is often how social and evolution-
ary scientists study trust and cooperation. Yet, we suggest that social
life also involves low-cost cooperation, such as information sharing,
showing respect, and conveying appreciation such as gratitude and
compliments (for related reasoning, see Van Lange & Van Doesum,
2015). It is possible that life history variations are especially expressed
in these daily acts of low-cost cooperation, such that slower strategists
(or those from benign early-life environments) may exchange “favors”
that are often nonmonetary, including activities that provide mutual
help and support in daily life.Although both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the pref-
erence for larger delayed rewards rather than smaller immediate re-
wards is an important feature of slower LH strategy (see Griskevicius
et al., 2011, 2013), we did not find support for the hypothesis that
slower strategists value future reward more than immediate benefits
(H2a). However, this result parallels some recent evidence that future
discounting is not associated with overall death exposure that may in-
duce faster LH strategy (Pepper & Nettle, 2013), or that thoughts of
death increase subjective value of the future (Kelley & Schmeichel,
2015). Indeed, a recent study that compared different “time preference”
measures suggests that delay discounting task had a weaker relation
with life history variables, compared to sensation seeking and impulsiv-
ity (Copping, Campbell, & Muncer, 2014a). Thus, future research needs
to fully explain how temporal discounting, along with other relevant
measures, relates to LH strategies that are adaptive responses to system-
atically different environments (e.g., harsh versus unpredictable
environments).
Nevertheless, the consistent finding of no direct relation between LH
strategy and cooperationmay have broader implications for research on
personality traits and cooperation. A case in point is that life history
strategy has been shown to correlate with personality differences in
agreeableness (e.g., Manson, 2015), which relates to cooperation across
different economic games (Schroeder, Nettle, & McElreath, 2015; Zhao
& Smillie, 2015). However, the empirical evidence on these relations is
somewhat mixed. For example, Hilbig, Glöckner, and Zettler (2014)
found aweak relation between agreeableness and cooperation,whereas
the HEXACO honesty-humility consistently predicted cooperation.
Other evidence suggested that honesty–humility only predicted active
cooperation (e.g., allocation to the recipient in a dictator game),
whereas agreeableness was only related to reactive cooperation (e.g.,
tolerance of unfairness as the recipient in an ultimatum game; Hilbig,
Zettler, Leist, & Heydasch, 2013). Thus, findings on life history strategy,
personality differences, and cooperationmay need to be explained with
great care, and it might be beneficial to distinguish between different
forms of cooperation.
7.1. Strengths, limitations, and future directions
The present research is among the first attempts to integrate life his-
tory theory with research on social decision making, in particular coop-
eration. Five studies contained convergent evidence from relatively
large and diverse samples from both an Asian and a Western society.
We also applied both correlational and experimental methods to test
our hypotheses, and a total of fifteen different economic games tomea-
sure cooperation. Indeed, the significant correlations between coopera-
tion in different games suggest that they tapped the same construct of
cooperation (Peysakhovich, Nowak, & Rand, 2014; Yamagishi et al.,
2013, 2014).
Before closing, we should also acknowledge limitations and poten-
tial avenues for future research. First, some of our studies manipulated
resource scarcity as an indicator of current environmental harshness,
whose effect may differ from that of environmental unpredictability,
such as unpredictable climate changes (Ellis et al., 2009). Future re-
search needs to distinguish current (or future) environmental cues of
harshness and unpredictability and investigate how they influence the
expression of faster or slower life history traits. Second, our cooperation
measures mainly focused on one-shot interaction with unknown
others, and could not distinguish cooperation in different interpersonal
contexts. An important avenue for future research is to clarify how var-
iations in cooperation fit with a life history framework, and to investi-
gate potential moderators. For example, one approach is to investigate
whether the optimal LH strategies relate to how people compute wel-
fare tradeoff ratios based on various internal regulatory variables that
encode features of interaction partners (e.g., kinship, value as a recipro-
cal partner) and the situation (e.g., reputational cues; see Delton &
Robertson, 2016).
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Life history strategy reflects an individual's adaptive responses to
early-life and current living environments, and have important psycho-
logical and behavioral consequences. The present research mainly
focused on how tendencies to follow faster or slower LH strategies re-
late to cooperation. We obtained some evidence that slower, compared
to faster, strategists tend to be more concerned about their reputation,
(somewhat but inconsistently) more prosocially oriented, and more
likely to trust others. However, the convergent evidence across five
studies revealed that fast and slow strategists do not show variation in
cooperation with unknown others in concrete situations. Taken to-
gether, these findings add to extant theorizing and research on life his-
tory strategy and social decision making, and suggest that life history
theorymay not account for individual variation in cooperationwith un-
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